The Court considered an award of attorneys’ fees to class counsel, who had settled eleven separate antitrust class actions, including one in North Carolina.

The value of the settlement to the North Carolina class was slight. The Court observed that it was a cost of litigation settlement of approximately three cents on the potential dollar of liability, which resulted in a benefit of $1.23 per class member, which it characterized as a "poor result."

The Court declined to follow the lead of the other Courts which had ruled on fee awards for the settlement (which had allowed a 25% fee), and followed the hybrid approach that it had adopted in the Senergy case.   After extensive analysis, the Court awarded a fee of approximately 10%.

Full Opinion

This case involved the question whether a joint venture agreement, by which the defendant acquired 47% of the stock of a non-party, violated the plaintiff’s right of first refusal under an agreement with the non-party.

The Court held that a restraint on the transfer of ownership must be strictly construed, particularly where the restraint may also have the capacity to limit competition in the marketplace.

The Court found that a party acting for a legitimate business purpose could not be liabile for tortious interference with contract.

Full Opinion

Action by plaintiff alleging that defendants had engaged in action in violation of statute was rendered moot by amendment of statute. The Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as a result of the amendment.

Full Opinion

Class action counsel were entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees where the settlement had created a common fund. The Court discusses various applications to an award of fees, including the lodestar method and the percentage method, and elects to take a hybrid approach which takes into account the reasonableness of the fees under the Rules of Professional Responsibility.

The Court further determines that the fee award must be based on the actual benefits received by class members.

After noting issues involving "consortium litigation" by the lawyers for the class, the Court holds that "class counsel in cases similar to this would be well advised to maintain and submit to the court detailed time records which would help the court" in resolving issues regarding fees.

Full Opinion

The Court determines that class action treatment is the superior method for adjudication of claims involving synthetic stucco, after considering the urgency of the problem, judicial economy, and difficult causation issues.

The Court considers whether changed circumstances warrant decertification of the class, and determines that the class definition, as previously set by another Superior Court Judge, should be modified.

Full Opinion

The claim here involved a Right of First Refusal. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants had engaged in a sham transaction designed to deprive it of its rights under the RFR, by effectively selling a controlling interest in the company in which plaintiff had the RFR through a Joint Venture Agreement.

The defendant sellers had been careful not to sell a majority interest to the buyer. The JVA gave the sellers various options to sell their remaining shares to the buyer after the expiration of the RFR, but buyer had no right to obtain those shares.

The Court held that the JVA did not violate plaintiff’s first refusal rights, though it noted that "it is apparent from the Joint Venture Agreement that it was carefully and artfully drafted in an effort to avoid or negate any claims that the written agreement itself violated the RFR."

The Court, however, allowed the plaintiff to proceed on the theory that there was an oral agreement to convey the remaining shares, an agreement which the Court found would have violated the RFR.

The plaintiff was also permitted to proceed on its claim against the buyer for tortious interference with contract, though the Court dismissed the claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, since the buyer had a lawful justification for competing with plaintiff to purchase the company. Since tortious interference is an unfair and deceptive practice, the motion to dismiss was denied as to that claim as well. It was also denied as to plaintiff’s claim of civil conspiracy.

Full Opinion

Plaintiffs’ claims against a health insurer for charging excessive rates were barred by the filed rate doctrine. The filed rate doctrine exists to prevent courts from intruding on the authority vested in administrative agencies by the legislature.

Full Opinion

Plaintiffs had established their right to involuntary dissolution of the closely held corporation in which they were shareholders because their reasonable expectations had not been met, and the business of the corporation was being conducted to the unfair advantage of the minority.

The corporation was entitled to avoid dissolution by paying the oppressed shareholder the "fair value" of his shares. Fair market value is not the same as "fair value," but is a determinant in that consideration.

Discounts for lack of control and lack of marketability do not apply when minority shareholders are compelled to sell their shares.

Full Opinion