The issue here was the admissibility of the testimony of plaintiff’s five expert witnesses, who proposed to testify on a variety of subjects.  The Court engaged in a thorough discussion of the scope, and limits, of expert testimony.  It held that experts will not be permitted to testify that a particular legal standard or conclusion has been met, as that would invade the province of the jury. 

Following this preamble, the court considered the five experts in turn.  The first was excluded because his analysis lacked an analytically sound basis.  The second was permitted to testify on the economic considerations that would face the defendants.  The third and fourth were permitted to testify as to the economics of the transaction and the impact of certain financial incentives, but were barred from testifying as to the future actions they believed the defendants would take as a result.  The final expert was permitted to testify on accounting matters. 

The Court also considered whether the plaintiff was entitled to an adverse inference as a result of the defendant’s destruction of evidence.  After discussing the issue of spoliation, the Court found that the destruction of documents had been done with an awareness of the litigation, and that the defendant’s summary judgment should be denied as a result. 

It held that "although the destruction of evidence, standing alone, is insufficient to allow a party producing such evidence to support a summary judgment claim, such destruction may push a claim that might not otherwise survive summary judgment over the line.” 

Full Opinion

A mortgage broker has a fiduciary duty to his client. Plaintiffs’ claims that they were charged excessive fees survived a motion to dismiss, as the Court could not determine whether various charges were interest, so as to be usurious, or permissible "finance charges." The Court deferred dermining whether purchasers of mortgage loans were holders in due course, and held that they were potentially liable as assignees under the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act.

Full Opinion

Defendant, a general contractor, served as project expediter on a major construction project. Plaintiff, another co-prime contractor on the job, claimed that defendant was responsible for damages it had incurred because the project was delayed. Following a trial, the Court found the plaintiff had not proven the essential elements of a delay claim, which are that (1) the delay was unreasonable, (2) the delay was proximately caused by the defendant’s actions, and (3) the delay had caused the plaintiffs injury.

There was no causal link between defendant’s duty as expediter and the delay. The Court determined that defendant’s work had certainly contributed to the delay, but the Court found that the Architect on the project had not assigned any direct liability for delay to the defendant, and that the Architect’s decision on this matter controlled. The Court also ruled that plaintiff had failed to link its allegation of delay to the critical path of the construction. The critical path item which defendant had delayed appeared on the critcal path long after the project began experiencing delays.

The Court also found that plaintiff, which had relied on a modified total cost method, had failed to prove damages. The elements of such a claim for damages are the "(1) impracticability of proving actual losses directly; (2) reasonableness of bid; (3) reasonableness of actual costs; and (4) lack of responsibility for additional costs." Plaintiff had not shown that proving actual losses was impracticable, and it had not shown that its bid was reasonable. Further, plaintiff had failed to adequately allocate responsibility for its extra costs. Since it, too, had contributed to the delay, there had to be proof of clear apportionment of the delay and expense attributable to each party. Plaintiff had failed to show that.

Another ground for denial of plaintiff’s claim was that it had failed to give written notice of its claims. The weekly and monthly project meetings, where plaintiff claimed it had raised the issue of defendant’s delay, were insufficient notice. The Court noted case law that permitted the requirement of written notice to be waived, but it held that "the multiple prime contractor setting poses a unique situation which necessitates a strict notice rule." Written notice would have permitted the Architect from resolving delay issues, and would have allowed investigation of the claims while evidence was available and the memories of witnesses were fresh.

Full Opinion

The determination of reasonable attorneys’ fee under nationwide class action settlement is within the Court’s discretion. The court considered Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(b) in making its award. It rejected the percentage of fund approach given the uncertainty of the amount that might ultimately be awarded to the members of the class. Class counsel had the obligation to present time records which justified their fee request, the Court would not ask for them.

Full Opinion

A director cannot be liable, solely because of his or her capacity as a director, for the wrongdoing of others associated with the corporation in the absence of his or her own participation in the alleged wrong.  The duties of a director run directly to the corporation, indirectly to shareholders, and not to creditors, so directors do not owe duties to outsiders except for torts that they personally commit.

The directors in this case did not breach any duty by failing to disclose a particular transaction with the exception of one who took affirmative steps to conceal the transaction. Nor was there any claim against the directors for negligent misrepresentation, as that tort was not intended to apply to corporate directors who fail to disclose certain information to the corporlation’s creditors.

The plaintiff had no claim for unfair and deceptive practices, because that statute does not apply to transactions involving securities.

Full Opinion

The Court discusses a variety of approachs to zoning, including contract zoning, spot zoning, single purpose zoning, conditional zoning, and conditional use district zoning. Due process requirements are discussed as well. The Court determines that the City of Charlotte’s system of conditional use zoning violated the applicable statute because it did not require the issuance of a conditional use permit. This deicsion was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

Full Opinion

The claims of the class plaintiff were barred by the statute of limitations. Although the statute of limitations had been tolled during the pendency of a prior class action involving the same matters, it resumed running when class certification was denied in the prior action. Tolling did not continue during the period of the appeal of the prior action. The Court adopted the "no-piggybacking" rule followed in the federal courts.

As an alternative basis for this holding, the Court found that plaintiff’ was bound by the determination in the prior action that class certification was not appropriate, and that her claim for class certification was therefore barred by collateral estoppel.

Full Opinion

The Court denied a motion for certification of a class of persons who had been extended credit by a national bank for the purpose of purchasing "force-place" insurance, because there were individual issues which made class certification inappropriate, including the need for each class member to prove reliance.

The Court also found that the plaintiff was not an adequate class representative because there were potentially counterclaims against her, and also because she had been solicited to be a plaintiff. The Court found that some of plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and rejected an argument of equitable tolling.

Full Opinion

The agreement at issue in this case was a long term requirements contract, in the form of a Cogeneration Energy Supply Agreement, by which steam and water were supplied to the owner of a textile mill.  The owner then sold its mill, and there were issues as to the rights and obligations of the buyer.

The Court found that the sale of steam and water involved the sale of goods under the Uniform Commercial Code, and that North Carolina law governed under applicable choice of law principles.

The issue then was whether the buyer had the right to assign its rights under the requirements contract.  The Court determined that the buyer was entitled to sell its rights to purchase steam and water, but that the right was subject to the supplier’s right to approve the sale, which was in turn subject to the standard of good faith and fair dealing.

 Full Opinion