Action by plaintiff alleging that defendants had engaged in action in violation of statute was rendered moot by amendment of statute. The Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as a result of the amendment.
In re Senergy and Thoro Class Action Settlement, 1999 NCBC 7 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 14, 1999)(Tennille)
Class action counsel were entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees where the settlement had created a common fund. The Court discusses various applications to an award of fees, including the lodestar method and the percentage method, and elects to take a hybrid approach which takes into account the reasonableness of the fees under the
Ruff v. Parex, Inc., 1999 NCBC 6 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 17, 1999)(Tennille)
The Court determines that class action treatment is the superior method for adjudication of claims involving synthetic stucco, after considering the urgency of the problem, judicial economy, and difficult causation issues.
The Court considers whether changed circumstances warrant decertification of the class, and determines that the class definition, as previously set by another Superior Court
Praxair, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 1999 NCBC 5 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 26, 1999)(Tennille)
The claim here involved a Right of First Refusal. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants had engaged in a sham transaction designed to deprive it of its rights under the RFR, by effectively selling a controlling interest in the company in which plaintiff had the RFR through a Joint Venture Agreement.
The defendant sellers had been careful
Lupton v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Carolina, 1993 NCBC 4 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 14, 1999)(Tennille), aff’d, 139 N.C.App. 421, 533 S.E.2d 270, disc. rev. denied, 353 N.C. 266, 546 S.E.2d 105 (2000)
Plaintiffs’ claims against a health insurer for charging excessive rates were barred by the filed rate doctrine. The filed rate doctrine exists to prevent courts from intruding on the authority vested in administrative agencies by the legislature.
Full Opinion
Lupton v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Carolina, 1999 NCBC 3 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 14, 1999)(Tennille)
A class action plaintiff may not take a voluntary dismissal of its action pursuant to Rule 41 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure without obtaining Court approval, even if the class has not yet been certified.
Peterson v. Robertson, 1999 NCBC 2 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 25, 1999)(Tennille), rev’d and remanded, 140 N.C.App. 386, 540 S.E.2d 79 (2000)
An alleged threat made over the telephone by was sufficient for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
Royals v. Piedmont Electric Repair Co., 1999 NCBC 1 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 1999)(Tennille), aff’d, 137 N.C.App. 700, 529 S.E.2d 515, cert. denied, 352 N.C. 357, 544 S.E.2d 548 (2000)
Plaintiffs had established their right to involuntary dissolution of the closely held corporation in which they were shareholders because their reasonable expectations had not been met, and the business of the corporation was being conducted to the unfair advantage of the minority.
The corporation was entitled to avoid dissolution by paying the oppressed shareholder the
Greene v. Shoemaker, 1998 NCBC 4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 24, 1998)(Tennille)
The Court discussed the sufficiency of and underlying reasons for a demand by a derivative action plaintiff, and found that its demand was insufficient. Among other things, "the demand requirement reinforces the basic norms of corporate governance by protecting the ability of the directors to make a business judgment about what is in the best
Bradley v. U.S. Packaging, Inc., 1998 NCBC 3 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 1998)(Tennille), aff’d, 134 N.C.App. 184, 525 S.E.2d 860, disc. rev. denied, 351 N.C. 99, 540 S.E.2d 351 (1999)
The Court granted plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment with regard to a promissory note.