Defendant, a general contractor, served as project expediter on a major construction project. Plaintiff, another co-prime contractor on the job, claimed that defendant was responsible for damages it had incurred because the project was delayed. Following a trial, the Court found the plaintiff had not proven the essential elements of a delay claim, which are
In re Senergy and Thoro Class Action Settlement, 2000 NCBC 7 (N.C. Super. Ct. )(Tennille)
The determination of reasonable attorneys’ fee under nationwide class action settlement is within the Court’s discretion. The court considered Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(b) in making its award. It rejected the percentage of fund approach given the uncertainty of the amount that might ultimately be awarded to the members of the class. Class counsel
Oberlin Capital, L.P. v. Slavin, 2000 NCBC 6 (N.C. Super. Ct. )(Tennille), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 147 N.C. App. 52, 554 S.E.2d 840 (2001)
A director cannot be liable, solely because of his or her capacity as a director, for the wrongdoing of others associated with the corporation in the absence of his or her own participation in the alleged wrong. The duties of a director run directly to the corporation, indirectly to shareholders, and not to creditors, so
Massey v. City of Charlotte, 2000 NCBC 5 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 17, 2000)(Tennille), rev’d, 145 N.C. App. 345, 550 S.E.2d 838, cert. denied, 354 N.C. 219, 554 S.E.2d 342 (2001)
The Court discusses a variety of approachs to zoning, including contract zoning, spot zoning, single purpose zoning, conditional zoning, and conditional use district zoning. Due process requirements are discussed as well. The Court determines that the City of Charlotte’s system of conditional use zoning violated the applicable statute because it did not require the issuance
Bruggers v. Eastman Kodak Co., 2000 NCBC 3 (N.C. Super. Ct. )(Tennille)
Indirect purchasers had standing to assert antitrust claim, notwithstanding federal court precedent to the contrary.
Scarvey v. First Federal Savings and Loan Association, 2000 NCBC 2 (N.C. Super. Ct. )(Tennille), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 163 N.C. App. 205, 592 S.E.2d 620 (2004)
The claims of the class plaintiff were barred by the statute of limitations. Although the statute of limitations had been tolled during the pendency of a prior class action involving the same matters, it resumed running when class certification was denied in the prior action. Tolling did not continue during the period of the appeal
Pitts v. American Security Ins. Co., 2000 NCBC 1 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 2000)(Tennille), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 144 N.C. App. 1, 550 S.E.2d 179 (2001), aff’d per curiam, 356 N.C. 292, 569 S.E.2d 647 (2002)
The Court denied a motion for certification of a class of persons who had been extended credit by a national bank for the purpose of purchasing "force-place" insurance, because there were individual issues which made class certification inappropriate, including the need for each class member to prove reliance.
The Court also found that the plaintiff
Westpoint Stevens, Inc. v. Panda-Rosemary Corp., 1999 NCBC 11 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 1999)(Tennille)
The agreement at issue in this case was a long term requirements contract, in the form of a Cogeneration Energy Supply Agreement, by which steam and water were supplied to the owner of a textile mill. The owner then sold its mill, and there were issues as to the rights and obligations of the buyer.
The
Long v. Abbott Laboratories, 1999 NCBC 10 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 30, 1999)(Tennille)
The Court considered an award of attorneys’ fees to class counsel, who had settled eleven separate antitrust class actions, including one in North Carolina.
The value of the settlement to the North Carolina class was slight. The Court observed that it was a cost of litigation settlement of approximately three cents on the potential dollar
Praxair, Inc. v. Airgas, 1999 NCBC 9 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 1999)(Tennille)
This case involved the question whether a joint venture agreement, by which the defendant acquired 47% of the stock of a non-party, violated the plaintiff’s right of first refusal under an agreement with the non-party.
The Court held that a restraint on the transfer of ownership must be strictly construed, particularly where the restraint may