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Minority sharehoders did not have a "reasonable expectation" of continued employment after serious issues arose between them and the majority which rendered them unable to work together.

Those same shareholders did have enforceable reasonable expectations that their stock ownership interest would not be diluted, however, and the Court invalidated steps taken by the majority to improperly issue themselves more shares in the company.  

The Court held that the Defendants had been engaged in self-dealing through the transactions which diluted the ownership interest of the Plaintiffs.  It rejected the argument that…

Continue Reading Vernon v. Cuomo, 2009 NCBC 6 (N.C. Super. Ct. March 17, 2009)(Tennille)

The "reasonable expectations" of minority shareholders as to continued employment and continued stock ownership were the issue in Vernon v. Cuomo, 2009 NCBC 6 (N.C. Super. Ct. March 17, 2009), decided yesterday by the North Carolina Business Court.

Judge Tennille ruled after a one week trial that the Plaintiffs did not have a reasonable expectation of continued employment, given extreme animosity that had developed among the shareholders of the Company. 

On the dilution issue, however, the Court ruled that Plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation that their ownership interest in the Company would not be diluted, at least not through the means that the Defendants chose to accomplish that dilution. Plaintiffs were restored by the Court to their original ownership position and the Court ordered dissolution of the Company.

The Plaintiffs were two shareholders with a 40% ownership in TriboFilm, Inc., which was developing technology to eliminate silicone as a necessary lubricant in syringes.  They had a serious falling out with the Defendants, five other shareholders who controlled the remaining 60% of the Company.  The Court described the situation as "intolerable" and "dysfunctional."

The majority stripped the Plaintiffs of their status as employees, officers, and directors. Then, after each faction rejected an offer by the other to be bought out, the Defendants implemented a plan to virtually eliminate the Plaintiffs’ ownership interest.  Here’s what happened as the Court described it:

  • Defendants voted themselves "unrealistic" and "inflated" salaries (most of them had not had any salary at all before this) or salary increases.  The Company did not have the financial ability to pay these salaries.
  • The Defendants then agreed to defer a substantial portion of their new salaries.
  • None of this information regarding salaries and deferral was disclosed to Plaintiffs.
  • Next, the Directors voted to convert a portion of the deferred salary into Company stock at a penny per share, much less than they had been offered by Plaintiffs.
  • Defendants, in their capacities as Board members, then recommended to the shareholders that the number of outstanding shares be increased from 1 million shares to 15 million shares to permit the deferred salary conversion.
  • The Defendants informed the Plaintiffs that the reason for the new shares was to raise additional capital and pay certain obligations.  They did not disclose their plan to exchange their deferred salaries for some of the new stock.
  • The share issuance resolution was approved by the shareholders, over Plaintiffs’ objections.
  • The Defendants then each forgave $15,000 of deferred salary (an essentially worthless claim, given the financial state of the Company) in exchange for 1,500,000 shares of Company stock.
  • The effect of the transfer was to immediately reduce each Plaintiff’s ownership interest in the Company from 20.2% to 2.4%.

Plaintiffs sued, asserting that their "reasonable expectations" as shareholders to continued employment and continued ownership of their stock had been frustrated.  They lost on the first point, but won on the second.Continue Reading Reasonable Expectations Of Minority Shareholders Frustrated By Dilution of Ownership, But Not By Termination Of Employment

Defendant, who was a director, shareholder and former employee of the corporate plaintiff, moved to disqualify the corporate plaintiff’s counsel. He argued that he reasonably believed that the law firm had represented him with regard to the agreements at issue and a guaranty agreement. He also argued that disqualification was appropriate because the corporation’s lawyers had "responsibilities" to him as a shareholder and director of the company.

The Court denied the motion. It found that although the law firm had represented defendant with regard to the guaranty agreement, the former…

Continue Reading Classic Coffee Concepts, Inc. v. Anderson, 2006 NCBC 21 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 2006)(Diaz)

Plaintiff, a significant (42.5%) minority shareholder of the corporate defendant, filed a derivative action against the corporate defendant. The Court characterized the case as "a domestic case disguised as a derivative action." The Court looked to the law of Virginia, the place of the incorporation of the company, to determine the appropriate prerequisites.

The claims by plaintiff against the directors of the company were for breach of fiduciary duty, and they were therefore derivative claims belonging to the corporation. It ruled that the plaintiff had failed to make a demand…

Continue Reading Maurer v. Slickedit, Inc., 2005 NCBC 1 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 15, 2005)(Tennille)

The plaintiffs in this case sought the dissolution of a closely held corporation pursuant to N.C.G.S. §55-14-30(2)(ii) on the ground that the business of the corporation was being conducted to the unfair advantage of the majority shareholder. The Court found that dissolution was appropriate because the reasonable expectations of the majority shareholders were not being met.

Since the dissolution statute gives the corporation the opportunity to avoid dissolution by paying the oppressed shareholders the "fair value" of their shares, the Court moved on to a discussion of that concept. As…

Continue Reading Garlock v. Hilliard, 2001 NCBC 10 (N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2001)(Tennille)

Plaintiffs had established their right to involuntary dissolution of the closely held corporation in which they were shareholders because their reasonable expectations had not been met, and the business of the corporation was being conducted to the unfair advantage of the minority.

The corporation was entitled to avoid dissolution by paying the oppressed shareholder the "fair value" of his shares. Fair market value is not the same as "fair value," but is a determinant in that consideration.

Discounts for lack of control and lack of marketability do not apply when…

Continue Reading Royals v. Piedmont Electric Repair Co., 1999 NCBC 1 (N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 9, 1999)(Tennille), aff’d, 137 N.C.App. 700, 529 S.E.2d 515, cert. denied, 352 N.C. 357, 544 S.E.2d 548 (2000)